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 1. Introduction 
Before the onset of the global financial crisis, transition countries, particularly in 
central and eastern Europe, had embarked on what appeared to be strong and 
sustainable growth paths. The crisis has brought into question the sustainability of this 
process, and has heightened the need to develop a new growth agenda across the 
region. This paper provides a general framework for designing medium-term growth-
enhancing policies, while focusing on specific policies relating to competition, 
education and finance. 
Since the late 1980s the prevailing view as to which policies are most conducive to 
good growth performance has been known as the Washington Consensus. This view 
asserts that, no matter what a country’s geographical location or current level of 
development, the appropriate policy package to achieve growth is to liberalise trade 
and competition, privatise state-owned firms and maintain a stable macroeconomic 
environment. In addition, the Consensus highlights the importance of property rights 
protection and enforcement of contracts as essential preconditions for 
entrepreneurship and growth to flourish. More recently, however, this view has been 
challenged. For example, it has been argued that countries in south-east Asia
1 have 
grown rapidly over the past 40 years without fully liberalising trade, while China has 
made huge economic strides without privatising its large state enterprises.  
A recent report commissioned by the World Bank, known as the Spence Report,
2 put 
forward policy recommendations that are more nuanced than the Washington 
Consensus and take into account the different circumstances faced by countries or 
regions. It emphasises the common role that education, trade, competition and labour 
market mobility play in fostering growth across a wide range of countries, and 
stresses the importance of government commitment to pursuing growth-enhancing 
policies in the long term.  
Policies such as those advocated in the Spence Report are likely to foster long-term 
growth in the transition countries, although several crucial factors must be kept in 
mind. The different regions – central Europe and the Baltic states (CEB), south-
eastern Europe (SEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States and Mongolia 
(CIS+M) – had very different starting points in transition in terms of income, 
education and infrastructure. They have also differed substantially in the extent to 
which they have been integrated into the European Union and been able to develop 
market institutions. Another factor is the level of dependency on natural resources; 
countries that rely heavily on such resources tend to suffer from high exchange rates 
that reduce the scope for economic diversification. More importantly, and particularly 
when they are non-democratic, resource-rich countries also tend to have higher levels 
of corruption, poorer governance and spending priorities that can adversely affect 
growth. 
Education and competition are also of key importance for growth in transition 
countries. Aside from being among the main policy areas considered by the Spence 
Report, there is an extensive empirical literature showing that both education and 
competition matter for growth, even when taking account of institutions.
3 In 
                                                 
1 Principally Singapore, Hong Kong, Taipei China and South Korea; see Hausmann, Rodrik and 
Velasco (2005). 
2 Spence and the Commission on Growth and Development (2008). 
3 See Aghion and Howitt (2006). 
  1particular, the potential growth-enhancing effect of education has been well studied 
using datasets with large numbers of countries.
4 The growth-enhancing effect of 
competition has also been emphasised in recent cross-country and cross-sector 
analysis.
5 These are also areas where substantial progress is needed to catch up with 
average OECD standards and that are clearly susceptible to changes in policy 
preferences and design.  
Overview of growth in transition countries 
Table 1 indicates the pre-crisis growth experience of the three transition subregions, 
the OECD countries and some selected benchmark countries. Growth in the transition 
economies was substantially higher than in the eurozone and above the world average 
rate. This is because they are middle-income countries catching up with the more 
advanced economies in respect of both capital investment and knowledge acquisition. 
They grow faster because it is usually easier to imitate existing technologies that have 
been pioneered elsewhere than to innovate. In addition, capital accumulation involves 
decreasing returns, so that increasing the stock of capital raises output by more than it 
does in a country that has not yet accumulated much capital. Growth rates in the 
CIS+M have been the highest, mainly on account of the rising price of energy over 
the past decade. 
In relative terms, real GDP per capita is highest in CEB, followed by SEE and then 
the CIS+M resource-rich countries. At the bottom of the scale come the CIS+M non-
resource-rich countries. In CEB, per capita GDP is still only 55 per cent of the OECD 
average. Non-resource-rich CIS countries have a per capita GDP that is 12 per cent of 
the OECD average. It is also evident that GDP growth has been highest in those 
countries with the lowest level of GDP, signifying the scope for these economies to 
catch up. 
It should be noted that growth rates in transition economies, including the CIS+M, 
remain well below the 8-10 per cent range experienced by China and India, and are 
more in line with the second wave of emerging Asian economies such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia or Thailand.  
                                                 
4 For example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).  
5 See Aghion et al (2005). 
  2Table 1: Level of GDP per capita and average annual growth rates 
      1991  1996  2000  2003  2007 
Country groups  Indicator                
CEB  GDP  per  capita                          
   3-year  average  -4.1  4.2  4.8  6.8             
   6-year  average  0.3  4.4  5.8               
SEE  GDP  per  capita                                    
   3-year  average  -1.9  4.4  3.7  5.9             
   6-year  average  -0.2  4.2  4.8               
CIS, non-resource rich**  GDP  per  capita                                    
   3-year  average  -16.4  3.2  7.3  8.1             
   6-year  average  -8.0  4.5  7.7               
CIS, resource rich***  GDP  per  capita                                    
   3-year  average  -12.2  3.5  7.8  11.9             
   6-year  average  -6.6  5.8  9.9               
Non-OECD****  GDP  per  capita                                    
   3-year  average  2.8  4.1  3.5  5.5            
   6-year  average  3.9  3.8  4.4              
OECD****  GDP  per  capita                          
   3-year  average  2.1  3.7  2.0  3.3            
   6-year  average  2.8  3.3  2.6              
*       real GDP per capita based on ppp 2005 international $ (Source: WDI 2009) 
**     CIS non-resource rich:   Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Ukraine 
***   CIS resource rich:  Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
**** excluding transition countries       
Source: World Development Indicators 2009, authors’ calculations. 
  32. Framework for designing growth policies 
The starting point for analysing growth at a country level has commonly been to view 
the flow of domestic output as being generated from a given stock of factors of 
production, particularly capital and labour and their respective productivity levels. A 
country with limited capital can grow faster by accumulating more capital, whereas a 
country that has already accumulated capital does not gain much by increasing its rate 
of accumulation. Eventually, accumulating more capital will entail more capital 
depreciation than it can generate in terms of added output.  
From neoclassical to new growth theory: A natural starting point is to specify an 
aggregate production function which describes how domestic output flow is generated 
from a given stock of production factors, in particular capital. This production 
typically involves decreasing returns to capital accumulation; that is, one more unit of 
capital yields less additional output, the more capital has already been accumulated. 
For example we can write: 
 AK Y  , 
where Y is output, K is the capital stock, A is a productivity factor which reflects the 
existing stock of knowledge and the resulting efficiency of capital and labour in 
producing final output, and α<1 so that the production technology exhibits decreasing 
returns to capital accumulation. 
Growth in output can result: (i) from the accumulation of capital K; and (ii) from 
increases in the productivity factor A, that is, from productivity growth. Neoclassical 
growth theory emphasises capital accumulation as the main source of growth, thus 
taking productivity A as fixed. Capital accumulates over time as a result of investment 
and capital depreciation. 
K I K     , 
where  1  K  is the capital stock next period, so that  K K  1  is the net increase in 
capital stock per unit of time and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. 
Using the fact that investment is equal to aggregate savings in equilibrium, and 
assuming that people save a constant fraction s of their income, we have: 
sY I  , 
so that the growth rate of capital is given by: 
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In particular, a country with little capital endowment K grows fast by accumulating 
more capital, whereas a country that has already accumulated capital does not gain 
much by increasing its rate of capital accumulation: this is because of the decreasing 
returns to capital accumulation. And because of these decreasing returns, in the long 
run growth simply stops. This happens when depreciation catches up with savings, 
that is, when enough capital has been accumulated that  .
1 
 
 sAK  
  4The contribution of new growth theory is to explain sustained long-run growth by 
endogenising productivity growth, that is, the growth in A. The idea is that 
productivity growth results from innovations. In particular Schumpeterian growth 
theory emphasises the role of quality-improving innovations; that is, innovations that 
increase the productivity A of production factors.  
More recently, new growth theory
6 has linked productivity growth to innovation. 
Innovation in turn is motivated by the prospect of above-normal returns that 
successful innovators can realise. The theory suggests that innovation, and therefore 
productivity growth, should always be fostered by:  
  better protection of intellectual property rights to allow successful innovators to 
benefit from their endeavour 
  financial development, as tight credit constraints will limit entrepreneurs’ ability 
to finance new innovative projects 
  better education, as this will improve the ability to innovate and/or imitate leading 
edge technologies 
  macroeconomic stability, which allows for a lower, risk-adjusted interest rate that 
will enable entrepreneurs to invest more in growth-enhancing projects. 
Another important feature of innovation is what the Austrian economist Joseph 
Schumpeter referred to as “creative destruction” – that is, innovations displacing old 
products or old technologies. Therefore, faster growth typically implies a higher rate 
of firm turnover, as the process of creative destruction generates the entry of new 
innovators and the exit of old ones. Indeed, competition is likely to enhance growth 
because it enables this process of turnover. 
Overall spending on research and development (R&D) and the number of patent 
registrations
7 are good indicators of the level of innovative activity in a country. 
Transition countries lag well behind the OECD average. Also, while income levels are 
catching up, this is not yet the case for investment in innovation. In contrast to 
emerging Asia, where R&D has been rising in recent years, transition countries have 
not raised their innovative activity.
8  
 
More formally, Schumpeterian theory begins with a production function specified at 
the industry level: 
,
1  
it it it K A Y
         1 0    
where  it A is a productivity parameter attached to the most recent technology used in 
industry i at time t. In this equation,  it K represents the flow of a unique intermediate 
product used in this sector, each unit of which is produced one-for-one by capital. 
Aggregate output is just the sum of the industry-specific outputs  it Y . 
                                                 
6 For a more detailed discussion, see Aghion and Howitt (2006). 
7 Patent applications are filed with a national patent office for exclusive rights to an invention (product 
or process) that provides a new way of doing something or offers a new technical solution to a 
problem. 
8 See EBRD Transition Report 2008: Growth in Transition.   
  5Each intermediate product is produced and sold exclusively by the most recent 
innovator. A successful innovator in sector improves the technology parameter  it A  
and is thus able to displace the previous innovator as the incumbent intermediate 
monopolist in that sector, until displaced by the next innovator. Thus the first key 
implication that distinguishes the Schumpeterian Paradigm from the AK and product-
variety models is that faster growth generally implies a higher rate of firm turnover, 
because this process of creative destruction generates entry of new innovators and exit 
of former innovators.   
Distance to frontier and the choice between innovation and imitation  
There are a number of ways in which a country can increase its productivity growth. 
One is to imitate more advanced technologies that have been invented elsewhere. 
Another is to make a leading-edge domestic innovation that builds on and extends the 
limits of international technology standards. A country that is far from the 
“technological frontier”
9 can make substantial leaps forward in productivity growth 
each time it imitates leading technologies developed elsewhere. However, a country 
that lies closer to the technological frontier will need to rely primarily on new 
innovations, which are more difficult to generate, in order to grow further. 
More formally, a frontier innovation leapfrogs the best technology available before 
the innovation, resulting in a new technology parameter  i A  in the innovating sector i, 
which is some multiple γ of its pre-existing value. An imitation is a technological 
activity whereby the country or sector catches up to a global technology frontier  t A  
which we typically take to represent the stock of global technological knowledge 
available to innovators in all sectors of all countries. In the former case the country is 
making a leading-edge innovation that builds on and improves the leading edge 
technology in its industry. In the latter case the innovation is just imitating 
technologies that have been developed elsewhere. 
For example, consider a country in which in any sector leading edge innovations take 
place at the frequency  n u  and implementation innovations take place at the frequency 
m u . Then the change in the economy's aggregate productivity parameter  t A  between 
time t and time t+1 will be: 
) ( ) 1 ( 1 t t m t n t t A A u A u A A        , 
and hence the growth rate will be: 
) 1 ( ) 1 (
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 where: 
t t t A A a /  , 
                                                 
9 The technological frontier is the existing international limit of technological capabilities in a specific 
sector. In most empirical analysis, current US technology is used to proxy this technological frontier. 
  6 is an inverse measure of "distance to the frontier." 
In particular we immediately see that a country which lies further behind the world 
technology frontier (that is, with lower  t a ), should grow faster, all things being equal. 
The reason is that this country makes bigger leaps forward each time it imitates the 
leading-technology. In other words, it benefits from higher knowledge spillovers from 
more advanced countries. 
We could take as given the critical innovation frequencies  m u  and  n u  that determine a 
country's growth path. However, Schumpeterian theory derives these innovation 
frequencies endogenously from the profit-maximisation problem facing a prospective 
innovator. In equilibrium, these frequencies will typically depend on institutional 
characteristics of the economy such as property right protection, the financial system, 
and government policy; moreover, the equilibrium intensity and mix of innovation 
will often depend on institutions and policies in a way that varies with the country's 
distance to the technological frontier a. 
But in addition, the above growth equation makes it quite natural to capture 
Gerschenkron's idea of "appropriate institutions". Suppose indeed that the institutions 
that favours imitation (that is, that lead to firms emphasising  m u  at the expense of  n u ) 
are not the same as those that favour leading-edge innovations (that is, that encourage 
firms to focus on  n u ): then, far from the frontier a country will maximise growth by 
favouring institutions that facilitate imitation, however as it catches up with the 
technological frontier, to sustain a high growth rate the country will have to shift from 
imitation-enhancing institutions to innovation-enhancing institutions as the relative 
importance of  n   for growth is also increasing. 
Historically, the imitation of existing technologies occurred in Japan and Europe after 
1945 and more recently in the economies of the so-called Asian Tigers, such as China, 
Korea and Taipei China. Imitation has tended to occur where: 
  large firms can take advantage of economies of scale 
  there is limited labour mobility between firms, so that workers’ skills remain 
largely specific to their firm 
  there is limited competition and entry, allowing large firms to survive longer and 
make long-term investments in capital and labour 
  financial systems can provide long-term bank finance. 
In contrast, countries that innovate at the technological frontier have tended to require: 
  higher labour market mobility, so that innovating firms that enter new markets can 
more easily find workers who match their needs 
  more intense product market competition and low entry barriers 
  more focus on tertiary and, particularly, graduate education, with universities that 
can produce researchers and generate the basic science that firms harness to 
innovate 
  a bigger role for non-bank finance and stock markets that can help select the most 
promising innovative projects to finance. 
  7The overall effect of competition or entry on growth at country level therefore 
depends on the proximity of local industries to their respective technological frontiers, 
and on the technological level of new entrants. 
In light of these distinctions and differences, what can be said about where the 
transition countries lie regarding the technological frontier and how much have they 
caught up with it since the early 1990s? Although the transition region as a whole is 
lagging below the frontier by a long way – with a range of 12 to 42 per cent of labour 
productivity levels in the United States – the gap has been narrowing over the last few 
years, particularly in the EU member countries (CEB and Bulgaria and Romania). 
This indicates that there is also considerable variation within the group of transition 
countries. 
  83. Policies for growth 
Competition and entry 
This section focuses on the related issues of competition and market entry and looks 
at how the framework outlined previously can be translated into more specific policies 
to encourage growth. It provides some evidence regarding the number of market 
entrants and competition in the transition countries and then considers the appropriate 
policy response. 
In this section, it will be argued that product market competition enhances innovation, 
labour productivity and growth.
10 Existing levels of product market competition (as 
inversely measured by profit margins,
11 for example) are significantly below OECD 
averages. Policies to encourage product market competition are therefore likely to 
have positive pay-offs both for old firms, where competition can be a substitute for 
effective corporate governance, and for new firms, where these policies spur 
innovation by increasing incremental profits that result from getting ahead of their 
competitors. 
When comparing entry rates in transition countries with the OECD average, it can be 
seen that entry rates have been increasing since 2002 but are still below OECD levels. 
This can partly be attributed to barriers in the business environment that deter new 
entrants. Such barriers range from limits on the availability of credit to levels of 
taxation and other regulatory impediments.  
A recent study has found that credit constraints, particularly in western Europe, tend 
to act as the main barrier to the entry and post-entry growth of very small firms.
12 This 
is especially relevant for transition economics, since small firms regularly report 
access to finance as a major impediment to their business activity and growth 
potential.
13 
Turning to competition, evidence from the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), covering over 20,000 firms in 26 
transition countries, gives some indication of the extent of competition, focusing on 
trade and imports. The 2005 survey results show, that competition between imported 
and domestic products has become more intense over time in CEB and SEE, but less 
so in the CIS+M. This is due mainly to the recent increasing trade integration of the 
CEB and SEE region (principally through the EU accession process), but also because 
of increasing intra-regional trade. With the exception of commodity-induced trade in 
the resource-rich countries, the CIS+M region shows lower internal and external trade 
integration. 
Focusing on manufacturing industries in the three subregions, SEE and the CIS+M – 
with the exception of CEB – all other subregions have lower levels of product market 
competition than the OECD average. The extent of competitive pressure in an 
industry is indicated by the pricing power that is evident. Pricing power – or industry 
mark-up – can be measured directly using the Lerner Index. This is measured as the 
difference between value added and the total wage bill expressed as a share of gross 
                                                 
10 See Carlin et al. (2004) and Aghion et al. (2002). 
11 The higher the remaining profit margins of a given firm, the higher that firm’s market power and thus 
the lower the overall level of competition in that particular market. 
12 Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2007). 
13 EBRD, Transition Report 2006. 
  9output. Using a large UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) 
cross-country/cross-industry dataset to compare average mark-ups across countries 
between 1998 and 2007 show that average mark-ups are higher in the transition 
countries (particularly in SEE and the CIS+M) than their OECD counterparts, 
indicating that competition is less intense. 
The evolution of mark-ups reveals that they have declined over time throughout the 
whole region, and that CIS+M and SEE countries generally have higher mark-ups 
than OECD countries, the world average and CEB. This can be explained by a 
number of factors, including regulated product markets as well as low levels of 
diversification away from commodities in the resource-rich CIS+M countries. Mark-
ups remain substantially higher in transition countries, particularly in the CIS+M and 
SEE. Reducing them through increased foreign competition, either by further trade 
integration or direct entry of foreign firms, will help boost innovation and 
productivity growth.
14  
Chart 1 uses BEEPS data to assess the impact of competition on product innovation. It 
shows that both domestic and foreign competition have a larger impact in non-
resource-rich countries than in resource-rich countries. It can also be seen that 
pressure tends to come more from domestic rather than foreign competition. These 
findings may in turn reflect the fact that: (i) although foreign competitors might be 
more challenging to local incumbents in terms of technological sophistication, most 
firms compete mainly with their domestic counterparts (which may also reflect a lack 
of trade integration and additional barriers to entry for foreign firms); and (ii) firms in 
resource-rich countries are more likely to benefit from government subsidies that 
partly shield them from the effects of competition.
                                                 
14It can be argued that increased competition should discourage innovation and growth, as it reduces 
the rewards that accrue to successful innovators. However, this effect may be dominated by an “escape 
competition effect”, which may encourage firms to innovate precisely in order to escape competition.  
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Source: BEEPS, 2005. 
Note: The figures show the proportion of firms claiming that domestic or foreign competition is a (i) 
very important or (ii) not at all important pressure for the creation of new products. 
Recent evidence
15 indicates that product market competition and entry has a positive 
and significant effect on productivity growth in emerging market economies, such as 
India and South Africa. It appears that the same is also true in transition countries; 
Chart 2 shows that lower competitive pressure is indeed associated with lower 
productivity growth. The relationship is in fact substantially stronger for the EU 
accession countries and the group of transition countries as a whole in comparison to 
the OECD economies (as can be seen by the relative slope of the three lines in the 
chart). Therefore, even though transition countries are not that close to the world 
technology frontier, they are close enough for competition to be growth-enhancing.  
                                                 
15See Nickell (1996); Blundell et al (1999); Aghion et al (2005). 
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Source: UNIDO and Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies WIIW industry statistics and 
authors’ calculations. 
Note: The chart depicts predicted values from regression results of labour productivity growth on the 
Lerner Index, Lerner Index squared, accounting for year, industry and countries. Regressions were run 
separately for OECD and EU-accession countries and transition countries. 
 
This analysis confirms that insufficient competition leads to less intense innovation, 
which in turn slows the speed at which productivity catches up with the technological 
frontier. Too little product market competition also directly affects labour productivity 
growth. This is true not only for countries closer to the frontier – such as those in the 
OECD – but also for transition countries. 
In light of this discussion, the obvious question to ask is how transition countries can 
ensure that sufficient product market competition occurs and that it in turn translates 
into labour market productivity and, ultimately, into overall economic growth. There 
is an important role in this respect for effective institutions, such as competition 
authorities. In a 2007 competition survey, the EBRD measured the efficiency and 
effectiveness of these institutions: the overall expenditure on competition regulation 
and enforcement as a share of GDP; and an index that covers the efficiency of 
enforcement, with a focus on competition authority decisions relating to market 
dominance. With the exception of spending, the indicators are higher for the CEB 
countries than for the rest of the transition region. This has been driven partly by the 
EU accession process of the CEB region and some SEE countries, which has 
standardised competition legislation and enforcement procedures. SEE lags behind 
CEB in terms of contract enforcement processes (delays being primarily due to case 
backlog and an insufficient number of judges), even though overall expenditure is 
high. 
Experience from other emerging countries has shown that independent and 
transparent competition authorities can exercise a positive influence on product 
market competition. Rather than narrowly focusing on curbing the dominance of firms 
  12already in the market, competition authorities need to employ a broader approach that 
keeps entry and exit barriers consistently low and gives incentives to firms to 
innovate. This means adopting a broad-based approach with deregulation at its core. 
This will include clear and quick licensing procedures and eliminating as much 
bureaucratic blockage as possible. For registration requirements, a “one-stop shop” 
system and/or (ideally) online registration can significantly reduce the number of 
transactions and the time spent on related processes. An applicant might then submit a 
single form containing all the information required by various agencies to a single 
entity. Although some transition countries have moved towards such a system, 
registration requirements in the CIS+M are still cumbersome. There are also large 
differences across SEE countries in the indicators that measure institutional conditions 
for product market competition.
16  
Another important element in ensuring ease of entry and subsequent product market 
competition is the cost of construction licences and, more generally, property rights, 
registration and collateralisation. Again, there are large differences across countries. 
For example, registering a property takes between three days in Lithuania and 331 
days in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the OECD average being 28 days), while costs vary 
from 0.1 per cent of the property value in Georgia to 11 per cent in Hungary.
17  
In addition to their traditional role of investigating anti-competitive practices by firms, 
competition authorities also have important functions in holding to account, and if 
necessary filing cases against, local and regional government bodies whenever they 
restrict competition. Therefore, the case-by-case investigation of violations of 
competition law needs to be accompanied by competition advocacy, thereby helping 
to cultivate entrepreneurial activity and providing functional support to new firms. 
Education 
Using a large number of countries and data points for the period 1960-1992, research 
has shown that education enhances growth.
18 A higher level of education enhances 
innovation, as a more educated population is better equipped to contribute. In 
addition, a higher average level of education is crucial for the successful imitation and 
faster adaptation of existing modern technologies. 
Most existing studies on education and growth measure education in terms of 
spending (the fraction of aggregate GDP devoted to education) or in terms of 
attainment (the proportion of the working age population that has achieved particular 
qualifications). More recent research has been extended to include measures of the 
quality of education.
19  
Using internationally comparable test scores to measure the quality of students’ 
cognitive skills, a positive and significant correlation between long-term growth and 
the quality of education for a large sample of countries has been identified (see Chart 
3). 
                                                 
16 See the World Bank Doing Business survey (2008). 
17 See the World Bank Doing Business survey (2008). 
18 Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), drawing on seminal work by Nelson and Phelps (1966). 
19 See Hanuschek and Kimko (2000), Hanushek and Woessmann (forthcoming). 
  13Chart 3: Real GDP per capita growth and average PISA
20 2006 test scores 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2008 (World Bank 2008), OECD (2007), authors’ own 
calculations (regression results). 
Notes: PISA 2006 average country scores in reading, mathematics and science (in 100s). The graph 
shows the effect of an increase of 100 PISA points on long-term growth in per capita GDP (1998-
2006), controlling for real GDP per capita in 1998, enrolment rates in higher education (1991), degree 
of openness to trade and regional differences. 
Countries shown on the chart are: ARG-Argentina, AUS-Australia, AUT-Austria, AZE-Azerbaijan, 
BEL-Belgium, BGR-Bulgaria, BRA-Brazil, CAN-Canada, CHE-Switzerland, CHL-Chile, COL-
Colombia, CZE-Czech Republic, DEU-Germany, DNK- Denmark, ESP-Spain, EST-Estonia, FIN-
Finland, FRA-France, GBR-United Kingdom, GRC-Greece, HKG-Hong Kong, HRV-Croatia, HUN-
Hungary, IDN-Indonesia, IRL-Ireland, ISL-Iceland, ISR-Israel, ITA-Italy, JOR-Jordan, JPN-Japan, 
KGZ-Kyrgyz Republic, KOR-Republic of Korea, LTU-Lithuania, LUX-Luxembourg, LVA-Latvia, 
MAC-Macao, MEX-Mexico, NLD-Netherlands, NOR-Norway, NZL-New Zealand, POL-Poland, 
PRT-Portugal, QAT-Qatar, ROM-Romania, RUS-Russia, SVK-Slovak Republic, SVN-Slovenia, 
SWE-Sweden, THA-Thailand, TUN-Tunisia, TUR-Turkey, URY-Uruguay. 
The same research (using information for 50 countries over the period 1960-2000) 
finds that countries with better test scores have significantly higher annual growth 
rates in GDP per capita. More specifically, an increase in test results by 100 points
21 is 
associated with an increase in annual growth rates of 1.3 to 2 percentage points. 
Furthermore, a reform that would improve students’ outcomes by 50 points over a 
                                                 
20 The PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) study was carried out by the OECD in 
2000, 2003 and 2006. It is one of the few sources of international comparative data on education across 
regions (including a number of transition countries), measuring educational quality by testing the 
mathematics, science and reading skills of a sample of 15-year-old students. The PISA surveys make a 
particular effort to assess students’ skills in application and synthesis of concepts – the generic skills 
that are most relevant to the needs of the global economy. See Mertaugh and Hanushek (2005), 
“Education and training”, in Barr (ed.), “Labor markets and social policy in central and Eastern Europe: 
the accession and beyond”, Ch. 7, World Bank. 
21 This is equivalent to one standard deviation in the PISA results for OECD countries. 
  14period of 20 years would, on average, increase GDP by around 5 per cent and over a 
period of 75 years by 36 per cent.
22 
Other complementary research has also analysed the relationship between growth and 
the composition of education spending.
23 Results show that the closer a country’s or 
region’s productivity is to the technological frontier, the more growth-enhancing it 
becomes to invest in higher education, and particularly in postgraduate education and 
research. The further a country or region is from the frontier, the more growth-
enhancing it is to invest in primary, secondary and undergraduate education, which is 
more likely to make a difference in terms of the country’s ability to imitate existing 
technologies.
24 
However, the complexity of the relationships and the differences among the transition 
countries calls for a careful, country-based interpretation of these results before 
drawing strong policy recommendations. Suggesting that transition economies focus 
on primary and secondary education simply because they are not near to the frontier 
would be problematic. For example, without a good tertiary education sector, India 
would not have been able to develop its dynamic service sector. Conversely, while the 
transition economies can increase their growth potential by investing more in quality 
of primary and secondary education, this should not be at the expense of 
undergraduate or maybe even postgraduate education.
25 
Turning to the actual evolution of education spending and quality in the transition 
countries, Table 2 gives expenditure and enrolment rates across the different groups of 
transition economies as well as the OECD over the period 1999-2006.
26 
 
                                                 
22 Hanushek and Woessmann (forthcoming). The long-term effects are based on simulations. 
23 See Aghion et al (2008). 
24 What is true between countries is also true between regions within a country. For example, it has 
been shown that an additional US$ 1,000 per person in research education spending raises a US state’s 
productivity growth rate by 0.27 per cent if the state is at the frontier, whereas it raises it by only 0.09 
per cent if the state is far from the frontier; see Aghion et al (2005) and Vandenbussche et al (2006). 
25 See also the World Bank (2000, 2005 and 2007),  
26 Gross enrolment ratio is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age 
group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown.  
  15Table 2: Expenditure per student at different education levels and gross enrolment 
rates 
Expenditure per student at different education levels (as % of per capita GDP) and gross enrolment rates
Country groups
                             
Period                       













CEB Expenditure per student 
(% of per capita GDP) 17.4 19.2 21.9 22.9 27.8 24.9
Gross enrolment rates 101.5 99.5 95.4 98.3 47.4 58.9
SEE Expenditure per student 
(% of per capita GDP) 13.0 16.4 17.5 18.7 31.3 26.6
Gross enrolment rates 100.2 99.7 83.2 87.4 28.3 33.8
CIS, non-resource rich* Expenditure per student 
(% of per capita GDP) 10.1 13.0 12.9 17.4 29.9 26.5
Gross enrolment rates 102.2 98.8 82.6 87.0 35.3 41.0
CIS, resource rich** Expenditure per student 
(% of per capita GDP) 8.2 8.2 14.7 9.9 14.6 10.0
Gross enrolment rates 100.6 104.5 86.5 90.9 22.7 34.6
OECD*** Expenditure per student 
(% of per capita GDP) 18.7 19.7 24.1 25.0 35.8 34.8
Gross enrolment rates 103.2 102.9 109.8 107.6 54.1 61.6
Selected countries
Finland Expenditure per student 
(% of per capita GDP) 17.6 18.5 25.9 29.4 38.8 37.2
Gross enrolment rates 100.7 101.0 124.2 118.7 83.6 88.3
France Expenditure per student 
(% of per capita GDP) 17.4 17.6 28.2 28.9 29.1 32.2
Gross enrolment rates 106.2 106.1 109.5 110.4 53.0 55.1
United States Expenditure per student 
(% of per capita GDP) 19.9 21.6 23.6 25.1 28.0 25.3
Gross enrollment rates 100.3 98.8 94.0 93.9 73.1 81.8
Source: Word Development Indicators 2008 (World Bank)
*      CIS non-resource ricArmenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Ukraine
**   CIS resource rich: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Tertiary education Secondary education Primary education
 
The table shows that the proportion of expenditure on tertiary education has decreased 
over the past decade in all transition regions, but has remained virtually constant for 
OECD countries. Transition countries spend less per student than the OECD average, 
and also have lower enrolment rates. Expenditure per student in primary and 
secondary education (percentage of per capita GDP) has mostly remained the same or 
increased over the same period, although CIS+M resource-rich countries reduced 
spending on each student between 2003 and 2006. There are also large differences 
across the transition subregions: resource-rich countries devote the least expenditure 
to tertiary and primary education, and they have also much lower enrolment rates at 
tertiary level than non-resource-rich countries. This implies that countries with 
sharply rising resource flows have as yet failed to use those new resources to raise 
funding for education, and therefore risk missing an opportunity to address 
shortcomings in their educational systems. 
Whatever the level of spending as a share of national income, a key question is 
whether these expenditures and student enrolment numbers actually achieve the 
intended educational outcomes. One indicator that is comparable over a large set of 
transition and non-transition countries is the PISA test score that measures reading, 
science and mathematics achievement in a standardised fashion. Chart 4 links PISA 
  16test scores to education spending, and shows a positive and significant relationship, in 
particular for transition countries. Therefore, when taking account of income levels, 
increasing educational expenditure in the transition countries does appear to be 
associated with improved quality of education. 
 







10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Expenditure per student, secondary (% of GDP pc)
Transition countries OECD countries
PISA scores conditional on GDP per capita
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2008 (World Bank 2008), OECD (2007), authors’ own 
calculations. 
Note: PISA 2006 average country scores in reading, mathematics and science. Graph depicts predicted 
PISA 2006 results based on a regression of PISA 2006 results on mean expenditure on student 
(percentage of GDP per capita) 1998-2005 and mean real GDP per capita 1998-2005.  
 
Nevertheless, the quality of education for all transition economies remains still well 
below the OECD average and has even decreased in Russia. Furthermore, there are 
significant differences across the transition region. While student performance in CEB 
countries in 2006 was close to the OECD average, the average test scores were 
relatively low in SEE and lowest in the CIS+M countries. However, when compared 
with countries with similar GDP per capita levels, transition countries perform 
generally better than their peers.
27 Some countries, such as Latvia and Poland, 
achieved substantial improvements in students’ performance between 2000 and 2006. 
The full scope for improvement in cognitive skills in the transition countries becomes 
evident when results are not only compared with those in the OECD, but also with 
top-scoring comparator countries such as Finland. Looking at the mean test scores of 
the PISA tests in mathematics, science and reading skills for the top performers 
among different groups of countries, Finland’s students achieved the highest score on 
the science scale with 563.3 points (that is, roughly 50 points above the OECD 
average). The top performer among the transition countries was Estonia, with average 
                                                 
27 See EBRD Transition Report 2008: Growth in Transition. 
  17student test scores of 514.6 and 531.4 points for mathematics and science, 
respectively. Russia was the leading country in the CIS+M and Central Asia, although 
the performance of the Russian students in mathematics and science were below the 
OECD average. The scoring gaps between Russia and the overall PISA leaders range 
from 73.7 points for mathematics up to 116.1 points on the reading scale, while the 
corresponding differences with the best-performing transition countries (Estonia) are 
smaller but still amount to 38.9 and 67.7 points. The considerable gap between the 
transition and top-performing countries indicates the potential for improving 
educational quality and, ultimately, the growth potential of the transition region. 
The significant differences in test scores reveal the high potential for future 
improvements in the quality of cognitive skills in the transition countries. This in turn 
would have a strong impact on long-term economic growth. Russia, for example, 
could achieve higher long-term annual GDP growth rates of between 0.065 and 1 
percentage point, merely by catching up with the top PISA performers among the 
transition countries. 
In terms of policy, the transition countries need to invest more overall in education, 
but in a way that links that investment to quality improvement. While maintaining 
their focus on primary and secondary education, they also need to invest more in 
higher (particularly undergraduate) education. Without such investment, countries 
will not be able to effectively imitate technological innovations produced elsewhere. 
Alongside this challenge, better monitoring and evaluation systems would increase 
the effectiveness of investment in education. Further participation in school-based, 
national and international assessments such as PISA will also help policy-makers by 
clarifying their countries’ relative educational performance.
28 
Although Chart 4 indicates that higher expenditure per student tends to be associated 
with better student performance, the aggregate results mask considerable differences 
between countries. Studies analysing the effect of school inputs and resources – 
typically teacher-to-student-ratios, class sizes, textbook provision, teacher training and 
experience, monitoring of schools, school facilities and administration – provide 
mixed evidence on successful strategies aimed to improve educational outcomes that 
would apply to all countries. Overall, however, there needs to be better use and 
targeting of educational investment, improvements in teacher quality, increased 
accountability to parents, students and national educational authorities, and adherence 
to standards. Transparency through public participation and feedback mechanisms is 
important for delivering and regulating the educational sector effectively. In the 
transition countries, there has been a notable lack of such consultation. One way to 
promote accountability in the education system is through decentralisation and 
improvements in local school management practices. 
Another issue of concern to policy-makers relates to equal and good access to 
education. A student’s background seems to be a predominant factor in educational 
performance in transition countries, and much more so than schooling resources or 
institutional settings.
29 Aside from promoting inequality, this result highlights the 
need for policy reforms to help secure funding and improve access to education 
(including pre-primary education) for children from less well-off families. 
Furthermore, poorer regions need to be assisted with financial transfers from centr
government. The sustainability of, and equity in, the financing of education can be 
al 
                                                 
28 See also World Bank (2006).  
29 See Ammermueller, Heijke and Woessmann (2005). 
  18improved through the use of funding formulae based on expenditures per student. 
This can help combat poverty by targeting public educational resources on the poor.
  30
                                                
The PISA results show that students in transition countries lag around 17 points 
behind the OCED average (and 65 points behind the top performers) in terms of 
problem-solving skills and applying knowledge in new areas. Changes in the 
schooling curriculum at primary and secondary level and in vocational education are 
therefore needed to enhance critical thinking and provide children with more general 
and relevant skills. In this context, the curriculum for secondary education plays a 
crucial role, since it has a dual purpose of linking directly to the labour market as well 
as preparing students for tertiary education.
31 Chart 5 suggests that the transition 
countries have a higher proportion of social science graduates at tertiary level than the 
OECD average and some selected comparator countries (such as Sweden). In terms of 
vocational training, transition countries have a legacy of a very narrowly defined 
curriculum and they need to broaden and update it to increase the relevance of 
vocational training programmes. Involving private businesses more in designing 
training programmes will be important. 
The wider problem of skills mismatch in the labour market remains an important issue 
that needs to be addressed by policy. The EBRD’s Life in Transition Survey (LITS), 
carried out in 2006, found that one-third of all employees did not work in jobs 
corresponding to their educational attainment.
32 This mismatch was most prevalent in 
the CIS+M. The problem is not unique to transition countries, but it highlights the 
need to invest in more lifelong learning and retraining to help workers and firms 
continually upgrade their skills. Providing tax incentives for workers and firms to take 
up training opportunities has generally proved more fruitful than attempts to set up 
publicly managed training programmes. 
 
30 See World Bank (2000).  
31 See World Bank (2006).  
32 See EBRD (2007) Transition Report, 2007. The survey also found that around half of respondents 
favoured additional government investment in education as one of their top priorities. 
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Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
Note: Defined as the number of students graduating in a particular field expressed as a 
percentage of the total number of graduates of tertiary education. 
Financial constraints 
Recent literature surveyed by Levine (2004) points to a positive effect of financial 
development on growth. The underlying idea is that firms face credit constraints due 
to asymmetric information between financiers and firms or enforcement problems 
(borrowers may take the money and run, unless properly monitored). The lower these 
credit constraints, the easier it is for innovating firms to finance their projects and 
thereby move knowledge forward. Thus Levine (2004) shows cross-country panel 
regressions of growth on two measures of financial development: namely, the ratio of 
bank credit to GDP and the degree of stock market capitalisation, which are positively 
and significantly related with growth in the long run. 
While labour market rigidities are often presented as the main impediment to firms' 
entry, mobility and post-entry growth, as it turns out, financial constraints are at least 
as important. A recent study by Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2006) shows in fact that 
credit constraints act as a main barrier to the entry and post-entry growth of very small 
firms, whereas labour market regulations inhibit the entry of larger firms. This is 
particularly crucial for transition economies since small firms in transition countries 
report access to finance regularly as a major impediment to their business activity
33 
and growth potential and the growth of small firms is also significantly positively 
related to overall growth in transition countries (see Chart 6 below).   
                                                 
33See BEEPS data. 
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Source: BEEPS, 2005.  
More recently, Aghion and Akgicit (2008) use cross-country/cross-industry panel data 
to show that the closer a local industry is from its world technology frontier, the more 
growth of that industry benefits from higher stock market development in the country, 
whereas growth in industries that are further below the frontier benefits more from the 
availability of bank credit. The idea again is that growth in more advanced countries 
relies more on frontier innovations. But innovations in turn are riskier than imitation 
activities and they also involve firms with typically less tangible capital that could be 
used as collateral in case of repayment default. Equity financing then compensates the 
financier for this added risk, typically by letting them get a higher share of returns, 
even when these are high.  
Chart 7 shows the distance to the technological frontier (measured as the distance in 
TFP as a share of US TFP) for the transition regions, the OECD and world averages 
and a subset of OECD benchmark countries. The distance to the frontier in 
manufacturing is still rather large for all transition regions but while some OECD 
countries such as France and the UK lose competitiveness to the US over time, the 
transition countries’ distance remains constant. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using World Development Indicators, 2008.   
This suggests that transition economies which are less advanced than OECD countries 
should rely more on bank finance than OECD countries. The evolution of the ratios of 
private credit to GDP and the levels of stock market capitalisation for the OECD and 
transition countries over the past decade underline that transition countries are 
significantly below the OECD average and they also lie below China. 
However, unlike competition policy or trade liberalisation, financial development is a 
gradual process. It can be speeded up by the setting-up of good banking regulations, 
the elimination of non-performing loans, and by opening up domestic economies to 
foreign banks and direct investment. In fact, the increase in the share of foreign banks 
over the past decade has contributed to the decrease in the percentage of non-
performing loans in the banking system. This is not surprising: new foreign banks that 
take over local banks, impose stricter prudential regulations while also improving the 
efficiency of the overall banking system. 
Lastly, in the previous section, we argued that the relative importance of banks and 
stock markets should depend on the country's level of development, with more 
advanced countries relying more on stock markets to finance their investments. Now 
Chart 8 shows that Russia shows an excessive importance of stock market finance 
relative to bank finance.  
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Chart 8: Domestic credit and stock market capitalisation 
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Financing reform 
Promoting and enforcing competition generally makes larger demands on political 
will and reform capacity than on government budgets. However, entrenching 
educational reforms that make for long-term sustainable growth is more financially 
taxing. While the private sector has its part to play in overcoming the skills mismatch, 
governments are crucial in ensuring access to, and the quality of, formal education. 
For many governments in the transition countries, the scope for increasing spending 
on education is limited by their overall debt levels, as well as current budget deficits 
and their capacity to tax their citizens. And the ongoing financial crisis is obviously 
an aggravating factor in this respect. However, compared with their counterparts in 
the advanced market economies, many transition countries are relatively well placed 
in terms of their capacity to sustain debt and ability to repay it. For example, in CEB 
(with the exception of Hungary) all transition economies had debt-to-GDP levels pre-
crises (2007) that are below the 60 per cent benchmark imposed by the EU Maastricht 
Treaty for joining the economic and monetary union. Furthermore, most transition 
countries have run relatively small budget deficits, while over 40 per cent of them 
have actually run budget surpluses. On the downside, inflation is significantly higher 
in transition countries than in most OECD countries. Moreover, tax revenues as a 
share of GDP generally remain substantially lower than in OECD countries. The last point – the ability to tax – deserves more careful consideration. A closer look 
on the results from the BEEPS surveys 1999 to 2005 helps to shed some light on the 
overall low tax revenue figures in the transition countries. Over time, the development 
regarding the tax compliance seems to go in the right direction. The estimated 
percentage of firms underreporting sales for tax reasons (reporting less than 60 per 
cent) went down from 30 per cent in 1999, to 23 per cent in 2002 and 12 per cent in 
2005. However, even in 2005 only two-thirds of all firms report between 90 and 100 
per cent of total sales (“complete reporting”). 
 
Table 3: Tax reporting across the transition region 
 Year  1999 2002  2005 
% of firms 
  Estimated share 
of sales 
reported to the 
tax authorities 
CEB+2 All  other 
transition 
countries  
CEB+2 All  other 
transition 
countries 
CEB+2 All  other 
transition 
countries 
100%  33.64 31.43  56.55 52.28  62.61 67.34 
90-100%  13.77  12.55  5.94 2.45  4.30 2.19 
80-90%  10.47  12.21  8.85 6.14  8.17 5.16 
70-80%  8.24  7.74  10.49 8.65  11.55 7.30 
60-70%  5.52 5.07  5.99 6.53  4.59 5.10 
50-60%  6.92 10.88  2.46 4.20  2.55 2.79 
25-50  6.51 9.50  7.88 12.43  5.39 8.06 
<=25%  14.92  10.62  1.84 7.32  0.83 2.05 
Total  100 100  100 100  100 100 
Source: BEEPS 1999, 2002, 2005. 
Note: Based on the BEEPS survey question: "What percentage of the sales of a typical 
firm in your area of activity would you estimate is reported to the tax authorities, 
bearing in mind difficulties with complying with taxes and other regulations?" 
(BEEPS 1999). Although the exact wording of this question has been slightly 
modified over time, the answers are comparable. 
Furthermore, there are considerable differences in tax compliance depending on firm 
size. The survey results from 2005 reveal that truthful sales reporting seems to be 
much more established in large enterprises (three-quarters of all firms report full 
compliance) than in small firms, where presumably only 60 per cent report their sales 
fully.  
On balance one implication is that there may be room for countries to run counter-
cyclical fiscal policies
34 and continue investing during an economic downturn such as 
what the world is currently experiencing. As with spending on R&D, experience 
suggests that pro-cyclical spending on education should be avoided. For the non-
resource-rich transition countries in particular, counter-cyclical spending would best 
take the form of debt finance. Moreover, there is undoubted scope to change the 
composition of spending, with a greater share being allocated to education on the 
grounds that it enhances growth.  
                                                 
34 Counter-cyclical in this context means continuing investments independent of the economic cycle; 
that is, committing a similar amount of resource to education in both boom and in downturn times. Pro-
cyclical investments are aligned with the overall economic cycle, increasing in boom periods and 
decreasing in economic downturns. 
  24The situation facing the resource-rich countries of the CIS+M is rather different. 
Potential exists to finance growth-enhancing reforms, even at the current levels of tax 
revenue and enforcement. One approach may be through greater “earmarking” of 
revenues for particular policy areas, particularly when resources have been 
accumulated in stabilisation funds (as in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia). Such 
accumulated revenues have been used for general budget support rather than for 
specific purposes, but a case can be made for targeting them at policy areas, such as 
education, that are expected to have positive consequences for long-term growth. 
Indeed, the previous section showed that as resource prices increased – the actual 
share of spending on education has tended to fall in resource-rich countries – an 
undesirable outcome given the already relatively low levels of expenditure. Better 
targeting of resources in a medium-term financing framework might help rectify this.  
While governments have a major role to play in ensuring quality and access to formal 
education, the private sector is also crucial in helping to match formal skills to labour 
market requirements. This can be done through internships, informal on-the-job 
training or university scholarship funding. Such firm- and/or industry-specific 
investment promotes skills that increase both labour productivity and labour mobility 
and therefore has positive direct spillovers to the whole economy.  
However, to invest in training and skills enhancement, firms need to be able to access 
medium-term credit. There is widespread evidence that, despite changes in bank 
ownership and the growth in non-bank finance, firms in the transition region still find 
it difficult to access the formal credit markets. For firms that are relatively far from 
the technological frontier, better availability of bank credit will be crucial. For firms 
closer to the frontier, innovation will be riskier than imitation and such firms will 
typically have less tangible capital that could be used as collateral in case of 
repayment default. Equity financing can compensate the financier for this added risk, 
typically by letting them get a higher share of returns.  
Conclusion 
This paper has reviewed the growth experiences of the transition countries. It has 
argued that general and non sector-specific government intervention can substantially 
increase long term growth prospects in these countries. While specific sectors might 
additionally benefit from specific policy measures, this paper emphasises the 
overarching growth-enhancing policies.
35 We have focused on two areas where policy 
can be particularly effective, namely competition and the quality of education. Thus if 
transition countries are to achieve – and sustain – higher growth rates in the long run, 
they will need to ensure competition by continuing to remove entry and trade barriers 
and by strengthening – and, in some cases, setting up competition agencies. This is 
particularly true for CIS and the resource-rich countries. Second, the transition 
countries as a group need to invest more in the quality of primary and secondary 
education, which in turn implies that they must also invest more in tertiary, especially 
undergraduate, education so as to improve teacher quality and the evaluation and 
monitoring of the overall education system. Again, somewhat paradoxically, it is the 
resource-rich CIS countries that suffer most from insufficient investment in education 
and in problems with the quality of the educational services that are provided. Lastly, 
the paper argued that they may be scope for macroeconomic policies that boost 
                                                 
35For a sector-specific analysis of innovation policy see for example Boheim, Reinstaller, and Unterlass 
(2008).  
  25spending on these key areas. For education, in particular, the private sector’s role in 
overcoming skill mismatch will benefit from deepening financial intermediation and 
reducing constraints in access to finance.  
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